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HISTORICAL

Operations of the military  
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Department, London




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OPERATIONS  
OF THE  
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SERVICE  
WAR DEPARTMENT  
LONDON  
(MIS WD LONDON)

US Army Intelligence Center & School  
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CONTENTS

REPORT OF SPECIAL SECURITY OPERATIONS IN THE EUROPEAN THEATER.....	2
HISTORY OF 3-US.....	5

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Report of Special Security Operations in  
the European Theater

The American unit responsible for handling Ultra intelligence in the European Theater was known as MIS, WD, London. Its existence derived from an agreement dated 17 May 1943 between the British Government Code and Cipher School and the U.S. War Department which provided for complete cooperation between the signatories in all matters pertaining to Special Intelligence.

MIS WD London had three main functions: (1) U.S. liaison officers, working with British personnel at GC&CS, examined incoming messages, selected those which should be sent to recipients in the field and drafted the necessary signals to recipients. (2) U.S. liaison officers at GC&CS examined messages and summaries, selected those desired for transmittal to Washington for G-2, and prepared the material for transmission. (3) U.S. liaison officers, properly trained at GC&CS, were attached to field commands "where an American officer is Commander-in-Chief" to advise the commander on Ultra matters and "overcome difficulties that might arise in regard to differences in language."

MIS WD London also assigned (1) an officer to work with the British on diplomatic messages, exchanging with G-2 whatever was deemed important, and (2) an officer to work with the British on the production of Special Counter Intelligence.

The unit became operational in the summer of 1943. Lt. Col. (now Col.) Taylor as chief settled at GC&CS. Major (later Lt. Col.) Calfee represented the unit [ ] where counter intelligence was handled. Major (now Col.) McKee joined Col. Taylor in August and service to Washington then commenced.

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A few recruits arrived towards the end of the year, and by the end of January 1944 the organization was taking shape. Officers were being trained at GC&CS for the various missions of the unit. Cols. Taylor and McKee were devoting almost full time to arranging for our representatives to be attached to armies, tactical air forces, and higher headquarters. Major Littlefield and Major Calfee represented the unit in the <sup>diplomatic</sup> ~~development~~ and counter intelligence fields. Major Hilles was in charge of the group at GC&CS which included (1) a dozen "advisors" (half air, half ground) who were disseminating intelligence to the field, (2) a dozen SSRs (half air, half ground), training to go to commands in the field, (3) a small "collection unit" servicing G-2 Washington, consisting of Captains Gardner and Slusser (German Army), Lt. Kellogg (GAF) and Miss Kitchen (administrative assistant).

Detailed accounts of the origins and development of the unit are appended. What is not there covered is the work of Cols. Taylor and McKee, who skilfully and patiently built up the unit and saw to it that it functioned efficiently.

Perhaps the greatest contribution made by Col. McKee was in organizing the Field Intelligence Unit. While Col. Taylor was primarily engaged in seeing that Ultra regulations were enforced, Col. McKee prepared the way for liaison officers to go to the commands which were serviced. Both officers made frequent trips to the various commands and in that way were in a position to cope with problems as they arose.

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As the theater of war enlarged, the list of Ultra recipients tended to swell. Col Taylor personally passed on all recommendations to add to this list and, working with his British opposite number, managed to keep the numbers under control. Violations of security were rare. Normally they were settled by prompt action on the part of the senior intelligence officer, at the instigation of Col Taylor.

As will be obvious from glancing through the appended reports, MIS WD London at all times worked closely with the British. There were few problems which could be labelled purely "American" and these were closely tied up with the organization of American commands. Col Taylor's success was in large measure due to his ability to work smoothly with British officials at GC&CS and ranking U.S. intelligence officers in the field.

*F. W. Villes*  
F. W. VILLES  
Lt Colonel, GSC

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AMERICAN EMBASSY  
OFFICE OF THE MILITARY ATTACHE  
1, GROSVENOR SQUARE, W. 1.  
LONDON, ENGLAND

11 June 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR COLONEL MCCORMACK:

Subject: History of 3-US.

2. Attached herewith is a copy of the  
history of 3-US

*F. W. Hilles*  
F. W. HILLES  
Lt.Col., GSC

\* \* \* \* \*

AN ACCOUNT

OF

THE ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT

OF

3-118

\* \* \* \* \*



## CONTENTS

<u>Chapter</u>		<u>Page</u>
I	Introduction	1
II	Biography	3
III	The Washington Commitment	14
IV	Diplomatic Affairs	20
V	Personnel and Liaison	27
VI	Conclusion	30

### TAB

A	Original Agreement. (17 May 1943)
B	Subsequent Agreement (25 September 1943)
C	Principles for Selection of Naval Items (30 April 1944)
D	Proposal for Improving Washington Service (15 January 1945)
E	Directive on Improved Washington Service (12 February 1945)
F	
G	Directive on Dissemination of Dip- lomatic Material (28 March 1944)

## CHAPTER I

### Introduction

As its name implies 3-US was the American section in Hut 3, primarily concerned with providing liaison between the intelligence agencies at B.P. and G-2 Washington. But it was much more than that.

The unit responsible to G-2 Washington for the handling of Ultra in the European Theater is MID, WD, London. But since all intelligence derived from Ultra necessarily passed through Hut 3, the controlling part of MID, WD, London naturally found its home in the Hut.

Much that went on in 3-US was not properly the business of Hut 3. Such questions for example as what individuals at American commands should be entitled to have access to ultra, or what action should be taken on violations of security regulations at American commands, questions which on the British side were handled at Broadway Buildings - were normally handled in 3-US. As far as possible in the pages which follow, such matters receive slight, if any, mention. An attempt is made to divorce the wider functions of MID, WD, London from the purely Hut 3 commitment of 3-US.

In general the main function of 3-US was to see that ultra was properly disseminated to the various American headquarters authorized to receive it. In this connection the chief task of the section was to select and edit CX/ISS for transmission to G-2 Washington.

As the various purely American headquarters under Shaef were set up, 3-US was charged with the responsibility of supplying properly trained intelligence officers to each U.S. Army and Tactical Air Command as well as to Army Groups and Air Forces. Inevitably this made 3-US the intermediary between American headquarters and Hut 3, and 3-US regularly long-stopped other sections in reviewing the routing of signals to commands.



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tion concerning signal intelligence. The U.S. assumed as main responsibility the reading of Japanese, the British the reading of German and Italian military and air codes and ciphers. Concerning the as yet unborn 3-US the agreement specified:

(1) U.S. liaison officers will be appointed at GC & CS to examine messages and summaries and select those desired for transmittal to Washington for G-2 or the Theater Commanders. All decoded material will be made available to those officers. Decodes giving information regarding Order of Battle will be handled as at present, i.e., through U.S. liaison officers in War Office and Air Ministry, respectively.

British channel

(2) Decodes or summaries to be passed to Washington through existing /

(3) Special Intelligence from this source will be passed to Commanders-in-Chief in the field through the special British units provided for this purpose. The officer in command of these units will have direct access to the Commander-in-Chief and advise as necessary on the security aspect of handling and using this intelligence. Where an American officer is Commander-in-Chief, an American officer, properly trained and indoctrinated at Bletchley Park, will be attached to the unit to advise and act as liaison officer to overcome difficulties that may arise in regard to differences in language.

Early in June the G-2 mission was dissolved. Col. McCormack and Mr. Friedman returned to America, leaving Lt. Col. Taylor as G-2's representative on ultra matters in this theater. Ultra matters included not only the productions of B.P.

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Throughout June and July nothing was done to implement the G-2/GC & CS agreement. Col. Taylor confined himself almost exclusively to diplomatic traffic, and while awaiting the arrival of assistants devoted little or no time to Hut 3 and its products. Late in July, however, he shifted the center of his activities to B.P. and for about a month underwent a schooling in the mysteries of the Park in general and Hut 3 in particular. Meanwhile he continued to work on ultra other than CX/ISS, and throughout August transmitted by cable to Washington a few of the more important items in ISK, ISOS and related series. After being thus engaged for almost a month he felt ready to begin a regular service. On 23 August he was joined by Major McKee; on 27 August the first CX/ISS was signalled to Washington. Perhaps it is worth mentioning that the initial message announced that Army Group B under Rommel was taking over command of the German forces in upper Italy.

No sooner had the service started than trouble arose. As has been noted the agreement made in May had, rather curiously, provided that intelligence relating to order of battle would continue to be transmitted to G-2 by the War Office and Air Ministry. In fact the ministries transmitted little order of battle intelligence derived from Source, and that in a form quite inadequate for the needs of the German Order of Battle Section in G-2. Furthermore, no arrangements had been made to handle the large volume of traffic to Washington; there were serious delays in transmittal and perceptible irritation on both sides. Various officers at the War Office took a rather cool view of the whole proceedings.

At the end of August, just as the service was starting, it became known that General Strong (A.C. of S., G-2, War Department) was on his way to visit England and B.P. Col. Taylor was then informed that, pending further discussion with General Strong, he was to send no more material to Washington.



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Col. Taylor pointed out that this would cast a small cloud on General Strong's arrival and urgently requested that he continue the service so that General Strong would not appear to be confronted with a fait accompli when he arrived. This was agreed to, and a few more items were transmitted until ~~several~~ <sup>several</sup> days after General Strong's arrival. Nothing further was sent until the end of the month.

The matter came to a head at a conference early in September, attended by General Menzies, General Strong, Commander Travis, Mr. De Grey, Group Captain Jones and Col. Taylor. At this meeting it was agreed that Col. Taylor should select and transmit CX/LES material to Washington, but that his selection should be conservative and not include "low order" order of battle information. The appropriate ministry was to be informed of every item sent.

The accord reached was short-lived. Soon after the meeting General Strong reversed the previous decision and agreed with General Menzies that no CX/LES should be sent from B.P.

There followed numerous consultations. While these were being held General Strong returned to Washington, conferred with Col. Clarke, decided that he had made a mistake, and on 15 September directed Col. Taylor to try to reinstate the previous arrangements.

The position taken by the Americans may be summed up in two points which were stressed at the time; (1) intelligence of more than momentary significance which is important enough to send to commands abroad is also important enough to send to responsible staff officers in Washington. Further, what is important

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enough for ministries from the long range standpoint is equally important for the intelligence organization in H.I.S., WD, Washington. (2) The selection of the material to be passed to Washington must be done not at ministries by British personnel but at B.P. by Americans who are familiar with the requirements of G-2.

A week or so elapsed during which frequent parleys were held. Eventually the matter was favorably concluded at a conference attended by General Menzies, General Davidson, G/C Jones and Col. Taylor. The agreement, dated 25 September, appears below as TAB B. In brief, Col. Taylor was made responsible for the selection of what was to be passed to Washington but was to keep War Office/Air Ministry informed of items passed. The appropriate ministry was responsible for any notes or comments other than the purely factual ones which were made on the texts selected for transmission. Two days later the service was resumed, and 3-US, as yet unnamed, may be said to have entered the world.

## 2. Infancy (September 1943 - January 1944)

At the outset, as might be expected, the volume of traffic transmitted was low. It was the desire of the ministries that Col. Taylor's selections be conservative. Communications facilities for handling a large volume had not been developed. The small staff at B.P., a staff of two, had much to learn, and on the receiving end much had to be done to assemble and train personnel to process the incoming material. Gradually as the staff in Washington gained in stature the principles for selection of material broadened. It was soon evident that Cols. Taylor and McKee needed reinforcements. The first of these, Captain Slusser, arrived in November, and towards the end of December numerous others began to assemble.

This phase was for the most part one of experimenting and planning for the future. The form which the Washington cables were to take, the route by which the material was sent, conventions by which the nature of the material could be easily distinguished, these and other similar problems had to be met. 014

end of the year the machinery was functioning smoothly.

Meanwhile in Europe and America highways and byways were being combed to collect qualified personnel in line with the provisions of the original agreement of May. Plans for servicing American commands, plans for absorbing Americans in the Watch, plans for improving the flow of material to Washington - these were the problems of the moment.

And by January when a large number of inexperienced Americans were first groping down the dark corridors of Hut 3, Col. Taylor's section was considered sizable enough and different enough to receive its name. 3-US first appeared on the distribution list of Hut 3 periodicals in January, when the section entered upon a new phase.

### 3. Adolescence (January - June 1944)

At the beginning of 1944 the interests of 3-US were three-fold: there was of course the service to Washington to continue and develop, there was the training of American officers who were to take their place alongside the British in the Watch as air or military advisers, there was the indoctrination of a goodly number of others who were to be assigned to those American headquarters which were to receive regular service from Hut 3. Seldom have so many absorbed so much in so little time.

Little need be said of the first matter. The staff of 3-US responsible for feeding G-2 quickly grew from three to seven, although only five were operational, since both Cols. Taylor and McKee devoted almost full time to establishing liaison with the various potential customers in the field. The only noteworthy change in the service to Washington was a steady extension, notably in items pertaining to the GAF and in non-Hut 3 material like Police and Abwehr.

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- 9 -

Equally little need be said here of the training of advisors. The individuals had been picked by G-2. They were admirably trained by the veterans of Hut 3. Their sole connection with 3-J3 was administrative. They were wont to congregate in the rooms of 3-J3 for tea and to collect mail. The part they unconsciously played in the development of the section was in providing close liaison with 3-A and 3-M.

Those who during this period of growth frequented Hut 3 prior to receiving a field assignment presented a different problem. Again the training they received was entirely due to the cooperation of specialists in Hut 3, but the program worked out for them and the assignments they eventually received were the concern of 3-J3.

As early as October 1943 Col. Taylor was involved in the questions relating to the service to be laid on for American commands. In mid-December negotiations were under way to secure some sort of ultra service to the then American Theater Commander, General Devers, and his chief intelligence officer, General Sibert. In mid-January Col. Taylor took part in discussions as to beginning service to Cossac and its subordinate commands. In particular he was instrumental in the decision to service Fusag (later 12 Army Group) "as soon as they are ready to take".

Not long after, they were "ready to take". Fusag was still in a state of activation and was not ready for the normal Hut 3 service, but beginning late in January and continuing for almost three months the group received once a day a summary of ultra messages which threw light on the situation in France and the Low Countries. That summary was a commitment of 3-J3. In addition to this, 3-J3 was called upon to perform various minor tasks of a research nature with a view to assisting the not-yet operational intelligence section of Fusag.



3-US

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the new service be under-

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4. Young Manhood (June 1944 - January 1945)

The previous phase had been one of rapid growth, of preparation for the future. The months immediately following D-Day were marked by slight readjustments, but the character of the section had been formed.

The new phase opened with an attempt to somewhat formalize the section. Col. Taylor and his deputy Col. McKee had responsibilities which extended far beyond the fences of B.P. Within 3-US a Duty Officer was appointed. In addition there were two officers producing the Bay series, two officers processing military information for G-2, another two similarly employed on the air side, and two charming and competent secretaries who besides maintaining morale did the stenographic work, the typing and a host of routine tasks.

At the beginning of this phase service to Washington was considerably improved by shipping bag items by air rather than by water. Beginning 12 June those items not considered cable-worthy were sent by plane thrice weekly, which resulted not only in a speedier but a more regular delivery of material to G-2.

At the same time another attempt to speed up service was made. During most of its existence 3-US worked on a day shift only, from 0900 to 1800. Immediately after Overlord, partly because of the great increase in traffic, partly because the situation was thought crucial, but chiefly in an effort to get cables to G-2 sooner, the section operated on the evening shift as well. The experiment was short-lived. After a few weeks it was abandoned, since it was found that the more urgent material did not reach the section until after midnight, and because of a difference between Washington and London time such messages could reach General Bissell (A. C. of S., G-2) early in the day if processed at B.P. in the morning.

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The new phase in the section's history was further marked by the fact that there was no one then training to become a recipient in the field. By mid-June the section had turned out fourteen "specialists" who were assigned to field units.

At this time too the section began supplementing the KV service to American Strategic Bombing headquarters (USSTAF, 8th and 15th Air Forces), preparing summaries which provided a background of ground information, now required because of their new, tactical, role. After a short time the summaries became unnecessary since the commands soon acquired the ability to digest the regular Hut 3 service.

Originally the messages prepared for Washington were submitted to Lt. Cmdr. Dudley-Smith's Section which reviewed them and prepared them for the codists. The arrangement had been made partly, it may be, for monitoring, but also for guidance. For months before Overlord the system had seemed unnecessary. Finally, at the beginning of July 5-US itself prepared its messages for transmission.

A further step in maturing was taken in September, when it was ruled that all COMSEC <sup>was</sup> ~~was~~ to be sent to Washington by bag, the cable service continuing for those items which were timely. The details will be found in the next chapter.

Little more need be said of this phase. The tie between 5-US and the field was strengthened by frequent visits made to the commands by Cols. Taylor and McKee, by brief visits to the field of Hut 3 personnel and by the periodic return to B.P. of recipients. The manpower problem was always present; either the section seemed overstaffed or undermanned. Such matters are treated of below. But in general it may be said that the section functioned along the lines laid out, and not until mid-January were there signs of any significant change.

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5. Maturity (February - May 1945)

Something of a revolution in the life of the section was the change which was actually made in the middle of February but which was being planned during the second half of January. An account of the new departure will be found in the following chapter. In brief the work of the section was halved overnight when Washington began receiving signals direct from the Patch. Thereafter the function of 3-US was, as far as its commitment to G-2 is concerned, reviewing what the Patch had sent, and supplementing it. At once it became obvious that the staff could be greatly lessened.

A few months later a further step in reducing the section was taken. As it turned out, the new step never had a chance of developing. In theory the plan was good, whether it would have worked out in practice. This was to do away entirely with officers whose sole function had been servicing Washington. In their stead an air and a military advisor were to spend a week in the section on a rotating system. It was thought this would more closely tie the section in with other sections and would give G-2 the benefit of the greater knowledge and experience of the advisors. What happened was that owing to illness of advisors and a delay in the orders of the then redundant personnel only a half-hearted attempt was made to put the scheme in practice. Before it could be tested the Wehrmacht came to terms, and 3-US along with other sections in the Hut turned to fresh fields and pastures new.



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Chapter III

The Washington Commitment

1. ~~Principles~~ of Selection.

First and last the primary commitment of 3-US was to select and edit military and air items from CI/US for transmission to Washington. G-2 had during the protracted discussions of September 1943 requested and secured permission to receive "all desired intelligence". Precisely what was to be selected was left to the staff of 3-US. Now and then a polite or indignant signal would be received from G-2 indicating what should or should not have been sent, and on various occasions 3-US queried G-2 as to their needs. But little or no guidance was given from Washington. The staff was held responsible for passing all important information. Inevitably there were the border-line cases, and it is to be feared that the patient scholar, <sup>if he</sup> ~~and~~ compared carefully the output of Hut 3 with what was sent to G-2, would detect certain inconsistencies in the selection.

Curiously enough the principles of selection were never formalized and reduced to paper. A green staff at B.P. selected material for a green staff in Washington. The unbelievable patience and interest and wisdom of key people in the Hut served to guide 3-US. Fortunately too the staff of 3-US threw itself with enthusiasm into the work, and as time went on certain unwritten principles evolved out of almost daily and sometimes rather pedantic discussions as to whether a given item was or was not of value to G-2.

In the beginning the selection was heavily weighted on the ground side, largely because of the background of the early members of the section. In mid-  
Kellogg, a trained air intelligence officer, joined the  
January 1944 Lt.



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section and after he had become operational, which was in the short period of a month, the air content of messages more than held its own against the ground.

Naval messages caused a certain amount of trouble. The original agreement of May 1943 had limited 3-US to air and military intelligence. But many messages which were predominantly naval had a definite bearing on air or ground matters. These were normally transmitted, although in theory it was the American Navy through the Admiralty which passed such information to the few high-ranking leaders in Washington who were entitled to have access to ultra.

The matter came to a head in April, 1944. The particular item, pertaining to German troubles in the Crimea, was admittedly naval in origin but was inter-service in application. Because of its significance it was taken, at the request of the Prime Minister, direct to the President. Naval authorities then raised the question as to whether 3-US had the right to pass such information. Conferences ensued and as a result the documents attached as TAB C were written. They are included as the only record in writing as to the principles of selection then in force. It should be added that no further objections on the part of the Navy were raised.

Washington's interest was naturally strategic rather than tactical. Hence as a matter of course they were sent major order of battle items, messages throwing light on future operations, on manpower, on policy. But even from the start they also received Flivo reports, front lines, and the more significant so-called tactical items.

Supplementing what was selected from OX/ISS, 3-US also culled from Police, Abwehr, diplomatic and low-grade military and air sources items which were of military significance.



As G-2 and 3-US grew, the volume tended to rise. Eventually in the spring of 1944, when the primary concern of G-2 was Overlord, some of the material previously cabled was sent by bag, and all items relating to the Western Front were cabled. And immediately prior to Overlord, when the volume jumped to unprecedented heights, 3-US was forced to restrict itself, as far as cables were concerned, to the major items dealing with France and Italy.

By the summer of 1944 Washington was able to cope with all that 3-US was sending, and the selection of items to go by bag had increased to such a point that only a small proportion of teleprints and reports were not being passed. At the beginning of September, almost a year after the Washington service had started, 3-US proposed that G-2 be put on a par with the ministries in London by receiving a copy of all teleprints and reports. The matter was taken up with G/C Jones who secured the necessary permission from British authorities, and beginning 9 September the selection of items for the bag automatically ceased, since all were sent. At the same time the by then almost intolerable burden of reporting to the ministries each item transmitted was dispensed with, since the ministries knew that Washington was getting the total output.

For the next four months the task of selecting items was restricted to what should go by cable, in what form it should go, and what priority it should receive. Then in February a major change developed which further affected the principles of selection. In the interests of speed and economy it was decided that with certain exceptions signals originating in the Watch should be passed direct to Washington. The details of the new system are most clearly set out in a 3-US memorandum of 15 February <sup>JAN.</sup> (TAB D) and a Hut 3 Directive of 12 February (TAB E). 3-US thereafter restricted itself to reviewing what had been signalled, augmenting the messages where necessary, and selecting from reports, ROS's, etc. items which



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were thought important enough to be cabled. Thus during the final three months of the section's life, the task of selection dwindled.

In addition to selecting raw material from the normal output of Hut 3 and related agencies, 3-US was also responsible for passing to G-2 significant appreciations or comments by ministries or commands. From the beginning 3-US was allowed to scan all AIX's and MIX's and forward to G-2 those which might be of use in Washington. Soon the service was widened. A Hut 3 Directive of 8 December 1943 announced that "Brigadier Strong and Air Commodore Woolley have been granted facilities to repeat certain ultra appreciations (sent to War Office and/or Air Ministry, to Washington, to fulfil an obligation which they have through General Eisenhower to Combined Chiefs of Staff there. Normally replies to such signals will also be repeated to Washington in order to maintain a balanced picture there." The surprised historian reads in a 39 note of the same date: "Such signals will be cleared to Washington by bag or by COM signal at the discretion of Lt. Col. Taylor's section. If Lt. Col. Taylor's Duty Officer is not on the premises, Signals Officer will refer to Hut 3 D.O. for decision." What is surprising is the reference to Lt. Col. Taylor's Duty Officer at this date, when Taylor's section consisted of himself, Lt. Col. McKee, and Capt. Slusser.

Mention should be made of the handling of items in the 'C' series. That was passed to the DMH and his equivalent at the other ministries, it was early agreed, should not be withheld from the G-2. But every item in this series which was passed to Washington was first cleared with G/C Jones. By no means all items were sent. Perhaps half were considered of sufficient importance to be selected. These originally went addressed 'Eyes Only', followed by the names of the three recipients, the Chief of Staff (General Marshall), G-2 (General Strong, later General Bissell) and the Special Security Officer (General Clarke).



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Beginning late in August 1944 such items were passed in what was known as the MCC series, restricted to the three officers named above and the Director of Intelligence in M.I.C. (Col. McCormack).

## 2. Procedure

A few words as to the minutiae of the Washington service. The task of the editors in 3-US was to go through the output of Hut 3 and cull from it items that should be sent. These were divided into ground or air and each of these two (until the system was altered in September 1944) was further separated into four groups, depending upon the speed with which they should reach G-2. It was estimated that a cable sent from B.P. in the morning would reach Washington (a) the same morning if given the priority "immediate", (b) the same day if given the priority "important", (c) the next day if sent without priority. The fourth group, sent by bag, took approximately a fortnight to reach its destination until during the final year when an air service was laid on which cut the time more than half.

The messages thus separated into groups were arranged according to subject matter and chronology. The editor then carefully examined the teleprint and accompanying signal, if any. Often the signal was deemed sufficient, but messages like some of those signed Hitler or Rommel or Kesselring were generally sent verbatim. At times the signal would be expanded, or the teleprint curtailed. To a limited extent the edited message would be annotated - more so on the air than on the ground side - but the annotations, as far as the historian is aware, were always factual with the exception of comments agreed with ministries and already passed to commands. In other words the machinery whereby 3-US could write comments for Washington and have them agreed with War Office/Air Ministry was seldom if ever used.



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## Chapter IV

### Diplomatic Affairs

#### 1. Origin of Service

Prior to the inauguration of the Bay series, the field commands were on the receiving end of a sporadic and uncertain service by which intelligence of military value in diplomatic and attache traffic was sent to them. This was accomplished by the AWT series. A message seemingly valuable to the field would be noticed at BP \_\_\_\_\_, and when the opportunity presented itself, a MIX or AIX embodying the substance of the message would be prepared for appropriate commands. The system, apart from the delay involved, was adequate for the occasional message which was in fact sent to commands. It resulted, however, in much intelligence of military value remaining unsignalled because no one had the responsibility to forward it to the field. There were collateral disadvantages in the absence of continuity and centralized handling of the material.

Col. Taylor, accordingly, in January of 1944 commenced discussions designed more fully to exploit the potential value of the diplomatic and attache series. The American contribution in this field was proportionately heavier than in the military field.

\_\_\_\_\_ It  
seemed for these reasons appropriate that the undertaking be an American commitment.



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This proposal was approved in March both by G-2 and directors of intelligence in the UK. A copy of the initial directive by G/Capt. Jones is attached as TAB G. The directive followed the general outline of Col. Taylor's proposal, with the natural addition that ministries and Hut 3 sections should retain their normal responsibility for the form and content of all signals. This intelligence, under the directive, was to be sent to commands in a series known as BAY/ ---'s.

## 2. The Source of the Bays

Originally the Bays derived from three main sources, BJ's, SJA's and JMA's. The BJ series included all diplomatic traffic and those of the military attaches [redacted]. The series averaged about fifty messages a day, from which perhaps one a day would prove Bayworthy.

The SJA's, a series which commenced about the time the Bay series was inaugurated, consisted of messages sent by the Japanese Naval Attaches at Berlin and Venice, together with occasional messages from other Japanese officials sent over that link. Processed in Block A, the messages were teleprinted to the ministries, and 3-US received a copy of each teleprint. <sup>On</sup> an average ~~of~~ about five <sup>were</sup> messages a day ~~was~~ produced, from which four or five signals a week were prepared. Allied intelligence benefited considerably by the fact that both of the Japanese Naval Attaches who served in Berlin during this period were men of exceptional competence; they seemed able to produce comprehensible and reasonably accurate descriptions of technical equipment, and their occasional ventures into German strategy and defences were of a considerably higher order than ordinarily encountered in the attache field.



JMA's,

comprised messages from

the Japanese military attaches in the various capitals. At full flood, 50 or 60 of these messages would be broken each day. The traffic was more voluminous than profitable, but the MI's did send back a considerable volume of Allied order of battle which proved useful to the "A Force." Occasionally too they delivered themselves of general intelligence of some value to commands, and there were a few gems such as the report of the military attache in France after accompanying the Ambassador on a tour of coastal defences. Less than one Bay a day resulted from this traffic, and most of these were selected for "A Force."



TOP SECRET  
SECRET  
- 23 -

### 3. Procedures

The mechanics by which this polyglot collection of information and misinformation was transformed into command signals was hardly complex. The messages arrived already translated. The Baywright's task was to select the appropriate message, do the research necessary for a proper evaluation, and draft the signal. The accuracy of the information, wherever possible, was verified by recourse to the indices at BP or the pundits at ministries. At times conversations with translators were profitable in clearing up linguistic or cryptographic difficulties.

The actual drafting of the signals could be a rather tricky business, since the elimination of the verbosity or indirection of phrasing in the original message was desirable and yet more hazardous than in CX/ISS. In diplomatic messages the tone is often highly significant. The drafter of Bays was required to strike a compromise.

When a signal had been prepared the ordinary procedure was to submit it, along with the original message, to the appropriate section in Hut 3 (or Block A) before dispatch. This involved recurrent visitations upon 3N and 3A, and more rarely upon 3 M, 3G, and Block A. After approval by the section involved, the signals during the early weeks were routed through both the advisors in the Watch and the Duty Officer. With the increasing volume of normal Hut 3 traffic it was directed in May 1944 that the advisors and duty officers should be spared participation in the Bays. Thereafter the signals went direct to 3-S.



#### 4. The Nature of the Bays

According to travellers returning from Mediterranean commands, the Bays provided a very welcome comic relief. There is some evidence to <sup>indicate</sup> ~~show~~ that in the west they were taken more seriously, perhaps too seriously.

The series included matters so trivial and inaccurate as the notion of the Japanese Military Attache in Lisbon of the disposition of Allied forces in Egypt. But it likewise included matters of substantial strategic importance. Reference has been made to one of the tours of coastal fortifications. Other noteworthy signals presented German strategy as dressed up for the benefit of Tokyo, and Japanese reports on the Wehrmacht's appreciation of major Allied intentions.

Much of the early and detailed information on the German jet and rocket plane program was found in Japanese (chiefly Naval Attache) reports out of Berlin. The only clear statement that something in the nature of the Ardennes offensive would be attempted was forwarded by Japanese Ambassador Oshima following his last talk with Hitler in August 1944. Unfortunately Hitler said the offensive would start in November, and the warning was not taken too seriously.

#### 5. Related Series.

The Bays were the vehicle for providing commands with diplomatic information of military value. A parallel series, known as Stars, extracted political



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information from the same sources. At the beginning, in the summer of 1944, the Starks were the responsibility of I.E. and were sent only to General Strong for General Eisenhower. The Starks consisted of verbatim texts of selected messages. Originally they were passed over the SIU link to Shaef, but after a few months, they were transmitted daily by courier.

3-US associated itself with the Starks in the autumn of 1944. It had come to Col. Taylor's attention that high ranking officers, British and American, at Air Ministry were from time to time disseminating political material to the higher commands associated with them. To regularize and control this and to coordinate Bays and Starks he proposed in a memorandum dated 16 November that one service encompassing all diplomatic material be created to service all persons whose work required access to such material. He based his proposal on the grounds that the system then operating was duplicative and inefficient for the following reasons: 1. The Starks and the Air Ministry series both covered political intelligence from the same source and in some instances were seen by the same recipient. 2.

3. Air Ministry, it was believed, was not fully familiar with the pitfalls and technical problems involved in disseminating diplomatic ultra. 4. Security would be furthered by centralization of dissemination. 5. To service leading military figures from uncoordinated sources is dangerous and confusing. After various conferences the proposal was accepted, and the responsibility for the service was divided between 3-US, IE,

The Starks were continued, <sup>and</sup> to the distribution list were added Air Commodore Grierson for Air Chief Marshal Tedder and General MacDonald for General



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Spatz. I.E. continued to prepare the items, which were sent out daily by courier.

3-US

and I.E. independently read the day's output, and if either disagreed with the selections a three-cornered discussion ensued until an agreement was reached. Thus the part played by 3-US in the production of Starks was to exercise control over what material should be disseminated.

Finally in May 1945, on the eve of the dissolution of But 3, the Nippi series was started. The recipient was the Japanese Section of G-2 Thaof. The principal aim of the service was to provide information from diplomatic sources which might aid in locating Japanese personalities and documents in Europe. The Nippi series which consisted of summaries, excerpts, or full texts from diplomatic sources, was transmitted by courier once a week.



Chapter V

Personnel and Liaison

Administratively 3-US controlled at its peak 68 people. Of these 19 were serving in the field as SIU's, 24 as 'specialists' at commands, 3 in London, and 12 as advisors in Hut 3. The remaining 10 may be said to have made up the actual section known as 3-US.

The head of the section necessarily spent most of his time in problems outside the scope of the section. The person in charge of 3-US was his deputy. Four officers serviced Washington, two on military matters, two on air. Another two officers handled all of the diplomatic traffic, and two civilians served in a secretarial capacity.

Had the war continued this staff would have been halved, since the service to G-2 would have been turned over to advisors and one civilian could easily have handled the greatly reduced secretarial work.

On the personnel side the great difficulty experienced by the section was that it was regarded by commands as a sort of reservoir. When there was need in the field for an American intelligence officer who had some knowledge of the handling of ultra, 3-US was called upon to produce a body. When the need was urgent the section normally sent its best qualified officer and then requested a replacement from Washington. Therefore what with the factors of time and space the section frequently found itself operating with five when it needed ten. Conversely traffic seemed to fall off just when large numbers of reinforcements arrived from overseas, so that there was not much work to be done and many idle hands.

The qualifications sought for in staffing the unit were an adequate grounding in military intelligence and if possible a reading knowledge of French and German.



But the work done by this particular section could be well done by any person with a reasonably trained mind and a modicum of common sense.

\* \* \* \* \*

In order to do its work properly 3-US maintained at all times close liaison with other sections in the Hut and with other parts of BP. In particular, the air side of 3-US, especially in the first eight months of 1944, was in constant touch with AI3F and the ground side with Mr. Page's section and the producers of police decodes.

Some amusement was caused by a cable from Washington to the chief American Naval Officer at B.P. advising him to do what he could to coordinate his efforts with 3-US. The relationship was always a pleasant one, but there was little in common between the two groups.

Close liaison was maintained between 3-US and American commands in the European Theater. As has been seen 3-US had at least one representative at all <sup>American</sup> headquarters which received ultra. Considerable chit-chat passed between these representatives and the mother section, and at times this liaison directly contributed to an improved service to the field from Hut 3. As has been shown in an earlier chapter, 3-US had a large part in initiating the inexperienced intelligence staff of FUSAG into the mysteries of ultra, and at a later date the section had a role to play when USSTAF widened its interests to include tactical as well as strategic matters.

By virtue of its nationality 3-US was constantly serving as American liaison with various sections in the Park. Almost daily the telephone would bring a



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question, usually baffling, concerning American order of battle, customs, slang phrases. The translators of Japanese attache traffic were ever hopeful that 3-US could explain to them what a "Weasel" was, or who commanded the 3rd U.S. Fleet.



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- 30 -  
Chapter VI

Conclusion

Then as an old man Benjamin Franklin was reviewing his long career, he asserted that if he were privileged to live his life over again he would choose to do just what he had done. The historian of 3-J5 cannot be so smug. Much that was done by the section should not have been done.

The previous chapters have been factual. The subject matter might well be handled differently by different persons, but the story would be substantially the same. The present chapter differs in being, necessarily, more personal. That we were not always right would be readily admitted by any historian. But where we were right, where wrong, is a matter of opinion. What follows is the individual opinion of one who has been closely associated with the section from early January 1944 to the present.

Much that was "wrong", as has been pointed out, was the result of circumstances over which the section had no control. The United States entered the war some two and a half years after B.P. had been set up. Another year and a half elapsed before G-2 and CG & CS agreed to share the products of ultra. It would have been impracticable, if possible, to have set up at that time or during the year that followed the system which eventually evolved. An organization had to be built from nothing; personnel had to be trained; facilities had to be developed.

Furthermore, as one examines the early records, the picture that emerges is of G-2 and British authorities walking around and eyeing each other like two mongrels who have just met. Presumably and quite naturally the ministries in London were reluctant to risk Source's neck by sharing his precious information.



with an unproved and shadowy group in Washington. Presumably and equally naturally G-2 was from Missouri and wished to be quite certain that he had access to all the material Source was turning up. The lack of confidence on both sides delayed the development of 3-US.

The chief mistake made by the section was its waste of time and manpower. Many hundreds of man-hours were needlessly spent in an overelaborate method of preparing signals to Washington. The idea was to simplify matters for our customers. The intention, whether admitted or not, was to guide them by a very careful arrangement of texts and references. Great emphasis was placed on matters which, it was gradually realized, were trivial.

Clearly if at some future date another Hut 3 is called for and another 3-US is charged with the responsibility of keeping G-2 enlightened, a system such as was developing at the end should be adopted as most efficient and most economical. G-2 should be treated, as far as the Watch is concerned, as if it were a high headquarters in the field (like Shaef). In other words, it should receive all signals sent to commands. At the same time it should be regarded as the ministries are and receive (by bag) a copy of all teleprints and reports. A very small section, possibly two officers and a secretary, could serve as liaison and could supplement by additional signals what would be sent out by the Watch.

The reasons for the section's diplomatic commitment have been given. They were good at the time, but in planning a future Hut 3 consideration should be given to the formation of still another section (3-D perhaps) whose function would be to serve as liaison with all agencies producing diplomatic traffic and to draft signals based on that traffic for the appropriate commands.



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One further point should be mentioned while considering where the section was wrong. Obviously it is a matter which goes far beyond 3-US and Hut 3, but its importance is such that it must be touched upon. We should have been righter if 3-US had represented naval as well as air and military interests. The problems concerned with a joint combined intelligence service have not been solved by this war. A solution is not impossible and is greatly to be desired.

It was right and proper that the section was represented on the various Hut 3 committees and concerned itself with related groups in London. It may be that the section's representative normally played a listener's role, since apart from diplomatic traffic the section did not handle raw material. Nevertheless, the gain to 3-US and to Washington from such participation was considerable, and the gain was not entirely on the American side.

The self-imposed task of reviewing signals sent to commands bore fruit. There were many times when 3-M or 3-A was annoyed by 3-US concerning the content or priority or routing of a given signal. On some of these occasions 3-M or 3-A refused to budge; but not infrequently, particularly when the Western Front was young, the criticisms of 3-US were accepted and action taken. The somewhat different approach of the section provided a useful check on the principal mission of Hut 3.

There is no question as to the rightness of having had a 3-US. Both British and Americans have gained by American participation in the work of Hut 3. Officially of course it was highly necessary that G-2 be represented in Hut 3. Unofficially the team play that was always in evidence should be encouraging to all who look to the future of both nations. In April 1945, the head of Hut 3 referred to "the friendship and close cooperation that have throughout so clearly marked the integration of American and British personnel". The phrase rings true to 3-US.



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May 17, 1943

Agreement between British Government Code and Cipher School and U.S. War Department concerning cooperation in matters relating to:

<u>U.S.</u>	<u>British</u>
Special Intelligence A	Special Intelligence
Special Intelligence B	Y Intelligence
TA Intelligence	Y Inference

A distinction is made in nomenclature and procedure in handling intelligence derived from the solution of enemy high grade and that obtained from low grade codes and ciphers. The preservation of secrecy in regard to either category is a matter of great concern to both countries and if the highest degree of security is to be maintained, it is essential that the same methods should be pursued by both countries at every level and in every area concerned, since a leakage at any one point would jeopardize intelligence from these sources not in one area only but in all theaters of war and for all services.

This agreement is limited to the traffic specifically designated herein.

(1) Both the U.S. and British agree to exchange completely all information concerning the detection, identification and interception of signals from, and the solution of codes and ciphers used by, the Military and Air forces of the Axis powers, including secret services (Abwehr).

(2) The U.S. will assume as a main responsibility the reading of Japanese Military and Air codes and ciphers.

(3) The British will assume as a main responsibility the reading of German and Italian Military and Air codes and ciphers.



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(4) Both countries agree that special security regulations shall apply to Intelligence obtained from decoding telegrams in enemy high grade codes and ciphers.

(5) Both countries agree to use their most secure codes and ciphers for transmission of the decodes of enemy signals and transmission of technical cryptanalytic data.

(6) British or U.S. Commanders-in-Chief, Military or Air, will receive all Special Intelligence necessary to them for the conduct of their operations from either British or U.S. centers as may be mutually agreed. Liaison officers will be appointed as desired for facilitating this. They will be given full access to all decodes.

(7) The distribution of intelligence from the sources in question will be governed by the fundamental principle that distribution will be restricted to the minimum and will therefore be confined solely to those who require to receive the intelligence for the proper discharge of their duties.

(8) All recipients of Special Intelligence A, whether British or American officers, shall be bound by the same regulations, the regulations (Appendix B) now in force in the theaters of war where British forces are operating to be accepted at the present time. If at a later date either country wishes to modify them in the light of further experience then this may be done by mutual agreement.

(9) The extension to officers of a knowledge of the existence of such intelligence shall be confined to as limited a number as possible and restricted to the levels of command in conformity with the above mentioned regulations. Great stress is laid on the principle that Special Intelligence A should not be intermingled in reports with general intelligence from other sources. If, however, it becomes imperative to do so, the whole must be treated as Special Intelligence A and given the same strictly limited distri-

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bution. Under no circumstances is it permissible to pass Special Intelligence A in a code or cipher which can be read by other than the authorized recipients.

(10) Although Special Intelligence B is not subject to the same stringent regulations as Special Intelligence A, since the two are closely connected, it is essential to maintain a high degree of secrecy in the handling of Special Intelligence B also. In any action taken upon such intelligence and in any documents or telegrams based upon it, it is essential that its origin be disguised and that the codes or ciphers used for its dissemination be absolutely secure.

(11) All intelligence available from decodes shall be made available to liaison officers, and if they deem necessary it will be exchanged between London and Washington. These liaison officers will be specially appointed and given full facilities for this purpose.

(12) British and U.S. will notify one another without delay, giving full particulars, when either has information from any source indicating the compromise of any code or cipher used by the other. Action on such information will be most carefully considered in order not to compromise the source and if possible mutual agreement in such action will be sought.

(13)

(14) Each country shall inform the other of the employment and scope in each joint theater of war of their Signal Intelligence (Y) units in the field.

(15) This agreement or the appendices thereto may be supplemented or modified from time to time governing any special feature for which either party wishes to make special provision.



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(16) Definitions:

(a) Y Service or Signal Intelligence Service. The British, U.S. Army, and U.S. Navy services concerned with intercepting, decoding, interpreting, classifying and dissemination of enemy communications, and the use of D/F and other specialized apparatus for establishing locations and identifies of enemy transmitters.

(b) Special Intelligence A. Certain ciphers are placed in a special category, owing to their importance and difficulty of solution. The intelligence derived from these ciphers is known as Special Intelligence A. Such material is treated with most stringent security measures. Special Intelligence A is confined to a very strictly limited number of the most highly placed officers and is mainly of strategical importance.

(c) Special Intelligence B. Intelligence derived from the solution of lower grade ciphers. Such ciphers may under certain circumstances be upgraded to the "Special A" class. The dissemination of Special Intelligence B is wider though always treated as British Most Secret - U.S. Secret. Special Intelligence B may be used tactically.



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APPENDIX (A)

Special Provisions Regarding Work on German Machine Ciphers

[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] This agree-  
ment provides that:

(a) All desired intelligence from this source will be made available to the War Department in Washington.

(b) [REDACTED]

(c) [REDACTED]

(d) Transmission of Intelligence to Commanders-in-Chief in the field will be accomplished by special routes and staffs who will maintain a watch over the use of the intelligence to guard against compromise of the source.

(1) U.S. liaison officers will be appointed at G.C. & C.S. to examine messages and summaries and select those desired for transmittal to Washington for G-2 or the Theater Commanders. All decoded material will be made available to those officers. Decodes giving information regarding Order of Battle will be handled as at present, i.e., through U.S. liaison officers in War Office and Air Ministry, respectively.

(2) Decodes or summaries to be passed to Washington through existing British channels.

(3) [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]



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[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
(4)

(5)

(6)

(7) Special Intelligence from this source will be passed to Commanders-in-Chief in the field through the Special British units provided for this purpose. The officer in command of these units will have direct access to the Commander-in-Chief and advise as necessary on the security aspect of handling and using this intelligence. Where an American officer is Commander-in-Chief, an American officer, properly trained and indoctrinated at Bletchley Park, will be attached to the unit to advise and act as liaison officer to overcome difficulties that may arise in regard to differences in language.

(8) The Director of the G.C. & C.S. will have the final decision when matters of security are involved in intelligence items (gossip) and as to what is passed to Commanders-in-Chief in the field.



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To: The Director - Personal.

D.M.I. - Personal.

A.C.A.S.(1) - Personal.

From: Wing Commander Jones

Date: 25th September, 1943.

The following agreement has been reached between all parties concerned on the transmission of CX/ISS intelligence by Lt. Col. Taylor, U.S. (in Hut 3) to G2 Washington:

1. Lt. Col. Taylor will select CX/ISS and/or JP texts, or draft condensed versions, as necessary.

2. If Lt. Col. Taylor feels that a comment beyond the normal scope of Hut 3 would serve a useful purpose he will contact the relevant ministry department. Such comments, when passed to G2, will always specifically state "agreed with War Office/Air Ministry."

3. Reference numbers, and/or texts where condensed under 1. above, and comments under 2. above, will be teleprinted to the relevant ministry immediately Lt. Col. Taylor's signal has been prepared.

4. If Lt. Col. Taylor has taken no initiative under 2. above and the appropriate ministry department feels that G2 Washington should have a comment from the wider background of ministries, they will teleprint it to Lt. Col. Taylor. Such comments, when passed to G2, will also specifically state "agreed with War Office/Air Ministry".

Note: As G2 sees the series between ministries and Washington, e.g. Sunsets, Dawns, Flights, etc., if the ministry point of view has been, or will be, represented in any one of them a special supplementary comment under 2. or 4. above will be unnecessary.

It is therefore proposed that:



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(A) Lists under 3. above should be teletyped in the series TOW  
(to War Office) and TAM (to Air Ministry):

To: M.I. 14 Colonel,

or D.D.I.3 or D.D.I.2 (as necessary).

From: Lt. Col. Taylor, Ht 3

The following have been passed to G2 Washington:

(B) Comments under 2. and 4. above should be teletyped in the series  
WOT (from War Office) and MAT (from Air Ministry):

To: Lt. Col. Taylor, Ht 3

From: M.I. 14 Colonel,

or D.D.I.3 or D.D.I.2 (as necessary).

Reference ..... please pass the following to G2 Washington:

Lt. Col. Taylor proposes to resume his service to Washington tomorrow.  
Grateful for your approval.



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30 April 1944

To: Group Captain Jones  
From: Lt. Col. McKee

Subject: Selection of Navy Items for Washington.

The main principle underlying the selection of Navy items for transmission to Washington has been that the content and not the source was the determining factor. If the signal contains information of importance to U.S. air and ground forces, it is sent to Washington.

Two points should be emphasized about the sending of these Navy items to the War Department, Washington:-

First: The great majority of items which are sent out as signals by the Navy section of Hut 3 are sent to air and ground commands in the field. In other words, 3-N in Hut 3 which drafts the signals has decided that these items contain information of value to air and ground forces.

Second: In sending signals from Hut 3 to various commands it has been a general principle, I believe, that superior commands receive all signals sent to their subordinate commands. If this principle were carried to its logical conclusion it would mean that the War Department in Washington would be sent all signals sent by Hut 3 to American and Allied field commands. This of course has not been the practice. It does seem necessary, however, that all important signals which are drafted by 3-N for transmission to American and Allied commands should be sent to the War Department, Washington, in the same way that all other signals originating in Hut 3 and containing information of importance to US air and ground forces are sent to Washington. If this policy is not followed in the case of signals drafted by 3-N as it is in the case of all other signals drafted in Hut 3, American field commands would be in possession of important information of which the War Department, the supreme American command, would be ignorant.



The following principles govern the selection of information derived from naval messages for transmission to Special Branch, War Department:

1. No purely naval intelligence is forwarded. The sinking of a naval vessel by a submarine would, for example, be considered a purely naval message.

2. Information affecting ground or air units, landing or evacuation operations, or significant data on ground or air supply is, on the other hand, sent to Washington whether the information happens to have originated in a ground, air or naval context.

3. The application of these general standards may be illustrated by a few specific examples of inter-service intelligence.

a. Information on the sinking of enemy naval vessels by allied aircraft is sent when the intelligence is considered of value to our air force.

b. Information relating to the movement or destruction of supply vessels is sent when it has significant bearing upon the supply problems of ground or air forces.

c. Reports on the mining of harbors or reconnaissance reports of Allied shipping are ordinarily passed over. But this type of information would be considered worth sending if there were an obvious connection with ground or air operations.

d. The movement of naval vessels is not reported to Washington except when it has direct relation to actual or prospective ground or air operations.

4. Cases in which the application of these principles is uncertain will in the future be referred to Group Captain Jones.



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15 January 1945

MEMORANDUM TO COLONEL TAYLOR:

Subject: Proposal for Streamlining Washington Service.

It has been suggested that our service to Washington would be improved if messages which are now signalled to SH and PK were at the same time routed by the Watch to G-2 Washington. In the following paragraphs the merits of this suggestion are discussed.

1. Procedure now followed. At present 3 US reviews each day all material sent to ministries, whether by teleprinter or courier, selects from this what is immediately useful to Washington, and cables it either in its original or in digest form. All teleprints and reports follow in due course by bag. In the light of the following paragraphs a word is necessary as to the various steps in processing what is now cabled.

Each morning the accumulation of evening and night shifts is examined by 3 US. Items are selected, arranged according to theaters and priorities, and edited. Copy for the codists is then prepared by cutting up the teleprints and pasting them on forms supplied by Central Signals Registry. The copy thus prepared is taken to CSR where it is registered by Major Jones's staff. It is then taken to Block E where it is encoded and transmitted to Washington by Mr. White's staff.

2. Proposed Procedure. It is proposed that the Watch be instructed to pass automatically to G-2 Washington all signals sent to Shaef and AFHQ except for categories hereafter listed. Such a selection would take care of perhaps 80% of what is normally cabled by 3 US. The messages so selected would be routed through the D.O. to 3 S for logging. Since these messages would in any event have been logged for SH or PK the extra labor involved for 3 S would be negligible. At present a message for SH or PK is, after being logged by 3 S, sent to Mr. White's section for encoding and transmission.

A carbon copy could at the same time be sent to him for encoding and



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886 (10151 U)

12th February, 1945

Service to G-2 Washington

From 0800z 13th February BTs will, with certain exceptions, be currently routed to Washington by the D.O.s. Thus, operationally, where the Washington service is concerned, D.O.s will bear the same relation to 3-US as they do to 3W, 3M and 3A in routing to Ministries: like Ministries, G-2 Washington ultimately get all CX/LSS by bag, so the problem for D.O.s is not what G-2 should get, but what they should get fast.

The change will speed up the service to Washington and effect a considerable man-hours economy in 3-US, without making more than a relatively infinitesimal increase in the work of the D.O.s. Incidentally, too, it will have advantages in the mechanics of dissemination.

D.O.s will route to Washington all BTs except:-

- (a) Met. reports.
- (b) A/F serviceability.
- (c) A/F occupations (when no units are named).
- (d) Allied O/B (when German intentions are not indicated).
- (e) Partisan activities.
- (f) Movements of small naval craft and any naval intelligence which has not a clear air and/or military aspect.
- (g) Supply returns.
- (h) Snippets based upon items already reported.
- (i) Summits.

BT chits will have a box marked G-2 after SH, and routing to Washington will be indicated by the insertion of "WA".

Washington's interests are much wider than those of any command; therefore some BTs will have to be augmented, and signals will have to be drafted on items which are never BTd, e.g. ROBs, Police. Such signals will be originated and prepared for Cypher Office as DUCs by 3-US, and passed by them to the D.O.



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do some of the editing and arranging which is now done by 3 US. Undoubtedly the plan would at least at the outset cause extra work at that end, but Washington would probably agree that the speeding up of the service would far outweigh this disadvantage.

6. Some Advantages of the Proposed System. If the plan were adopted, service to Washington would be accelerated, another step towards maintaining security would have been made, a further tightening of signals policy in Hut 3 would be achieved, and there would be a great saving of man-hours.

a. Service to Washington would be markedly accelerated. To cite an extreme case, a message signalled to SH at 1600Z does not reach 3 US until 0800Z the next morning and is normally not processed by 3 US until 1000Z (if "immediate") or midday. After it has been prepared for the Cypher Officer it must still go through the hands of CSR and the codists before being cabled. Because of the difference in time between England and America much that is sent could reach General Bissell a day earlier than it now does. His desire for up-to-the-minute information as to what is going on on the battlefronts is understandable.

b. An additional step towards maintaining security would have been made. At present the service to Washington is a notable exception to the rule that signals emanating from Hut 3 must not be handled in the Park by non-Hut 3 personnel. The checking and registering which now takes place in Hut 14 would at once be greatly reduced.

c. A tightening of signals policy in Hut 3 would be achieved. At present 3 S has no knowledge nor control of what is sent to Washington through CSR. The proposed change would tend to bring 3 US into line with existing arrangements for dissemination of ultra to the field.

d. A great saving of man hours would result. The proposed scheme would mean little additional labor for 3 S and would eliminate many hours of work for those in Hut 14 and 2 US.



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present wasteful. For example, a considerable proportion of time is now spent in converting references from RT's to DUC's or in cutting and pasting fragments of paper. In 3 US we are now employing most of the time of six people in preparing cables for Washington. The proposed plan would reduce this number by half, and two additional recipients for the field would become available. Furthermore with the elimination of much unnecessary paper work it is hoped that 3 US could devote more time and energy to assisting Rut 3 in its important function of servicing field commands.

F. W. Hilles  
Lt. Col., AC

R. M. Slusser  
Maj. Inf.



Other series, e.g. MEL/BTs, RAY/BTs, will not be affected.

Simultaneously, the following changes affecting Washington will be

made:-

- (a) G-2 and Eit 3 will address each other in the PROC/OLSU series, using the sub-prefix WA.
- (b) G-2 and Ministries/Commands will address each other in the AEL/GAD Series, using WA.
- (c) In both series WA will be used instead of "Home please pass", e.g. in GADs addressed to Ministries and repeated to Washington; and the SH and PK sub-prefixes will be similarly used by G-2.

The method of handling within and beyond 3S will be promulgated by

Mr. Moore.



TAB F

NOT RELEASABLE.



~~TOP SECRET U~~  
~~TOP SECRET U~~

28th March, 1944.

Diplomatic and Attaché Traffic.

With effect from 0800Z 30th March the procedure whereby Ultra from Diplomatic and Attaché Sources is selected for Commands and sent in the AVL series will be superseded.

Commands in the European and Mediterranean theatres will be furnished material selected by 3 US from these sources.

The purpose is to ensure that Intelligence of an operational value which originates in this traffic will promptly and systematically be furnished to these commands. The series will be known as RAY/VL (and will become RAY/KV when the VL series changes to KV).

A. The procedure will be as follows:

1. The messages appropriate for signalling to the commands will initially be selected by the Liaison Officer, Special Branch, M.I.D., War Department,

2. The Liaison Officer will report his selections to 3 US, Rmt 3, by scrambler telephone. I.E. will furnish 3 US with copies of the messages.

3 US will make a further selection of the messages appropriate for signalling and will draft signals for the commands, in consultation with 3M, 3A, 3N (Mediterranean) or N.S. VII, Block A (Home Waters (PAX 218)) as the occasion requires.

3. Upon review and approval by the Advisers and the Duty Officer, the signals will be sent to the Commands and teleprinted to the appropriate Ministries. The routing will follow the ordinary course.

4. Copies of RAY/VL's will be teleprinted as follows:

To: D.D.I.C.  
M.I.17  
D.D.I.3

From: D.O. Rmt 3

Ref. BJ .....RAY/VL is being passed with T.O.O. ....

056



~~TOP SECRET U.~~

5. The Ministries whenever desired will propose additional signals to the Commands based upon this traffic, and Hut 3 will retain its normal responsibilities for the form and content of the signals.

B. The following general principles will be applicable to the selection of the messages and the drafting of the signals:

1. The Intelligence sent to Commands must have value to the Intelligence staffs, including the cover-plan experts. Items of a "gossipy" nature will be sent "strictly personal" to recipients and normally only after consultation with the appropriate London Departments.

2. The signals should, where necessary, contain an indication of the reliability of the content through giving the source of the information and the originator of the message. Comments or appraisals obtained from or agreed with the Ministries may be added as necessary, using the customary formula "Comment agreed with .....".

3. Cross reference between RAY/VL's and VL's and/or MEL/VL's is not permissible.

for  
G/C Jones